Friday, March 27, 2015

Nile Dam Tripartite Agreement: who loses and who benefits? Why we should not celebrate too soon

by Aklog Birara (DR)

አምላካችን ያበረከተላትን ይህን ኃብቷን (አባይን) ለሕዝቦቻቸው ሕይወትና ደህንነት በማዋል እንዲጠቀሙበት ከጎረቤት ወዳጂ አገሮች ጋር በለጋስነት በጋራ ለመካፈል ዝግጁ ብትሆንም፤ ይህን የውሃ ንብረቷን በቁጥር እየጨመረ ለሚሄደው ሕዝቧና በማደግ ላይ ላለው ኢኮኖሚ ጥቅም እንዲውል ማድረግ የኢትዮጵያ ተቀዳሚና የተቀደሰ ግዴታዋ ነው።
ቀዳማዊ ኃይለ ሥላሴ፤ ጥቅምት 1957 ዓም
Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. In particular, an international watercourse shall be used and developed by watercourse States with a view to attaining optimal and sustainable utilization thereof and benefits there from, taking into account the interests of the watercourse States concerned, consistent with adequate protection of the watercourse.
Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, UN General Assembly resolution 49/52 of December 1994
I read the full text of Principles Al-Ahram (the Nile dam agreement), Egypt’s leading newspaper posted on the Nile Dam Agreement. The Agreement is a celebration for Egypt but of questionable efficacy for Ethiopia. This historic document was arrived at after a series of consultations at the highest levels of government and State on the Egyptian side; and signed on March 23, 2015 by Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegn of Ethiopia, former Field Marshall turned President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi of Egypt and President Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir of Sudan.
Nile Dam Tripartite Agreement
The Abbay River is dear to me and to millions of Ethiopians. In light of this, I had written a series of papers under the title ዐባይ እንደ ዋዛ in favor of Ethiopia’s fundamental rights to harness its water resources for the benefit of its own people; and urging Egypt to stop its belligerent, hostile, militaristic and bellicose approach in dealing with Ethiopia and other Sub-Saharan Africa riparian states. I had urged Egypt to rejoin the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) that it abandoned for five years. Refusal resulted in the unintended consequence of cementing relations among Black African riparian states. Sudan moved out Egypt’s spell and Egypt stood alone.
After listening to the Egyptian position and strategy of scuttling any form of “hydropower hegemony in Africa”—a clear reference to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) —in Doha, Qatar, I came to the conclusion that Egypt would do everything in its power to preserve its colonial based agreement of “historic and natural rights.” The question in my mind was what tactic it would deploy to achieve this? Finance opposition groups as it has done in the past? Use military force as the former President of Egypt Morsi had indicated? Accept the dramatic geopolitical and economic forces that are transforming Sub-Saharan Africa and creating new alliances in place of old ones? Opt for diplomatic solutions by restoring normal relations with Sub-Saharan African countries, including its primary traditional adversary, Ethiopia?
We now know the answer. For the first time in decades Egypt faces enormous challenges within and without. Renewed interest in Sub-Saharan Africa and more willingness to use diplomacy in protecting its national security interests reflects dramatic changes in the Arab world, the fragility of the country and the unease in the body politic within Egypt, and economic transformation in Sub-Saharan Africa. Equally, the government led by Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegn faces enormous political and economic challenges. Part of this challenge is perceived military threat from Egypt, internal political tensions and shortage of foreign exchange. In one of my articles on the subject, I had said the following concerning Morsi’s military solution. “Experts agree that his short-lived Presidency was well known for its frightening extremism calling for military intervention in Ethiopia and Syria. It seems to me that, in the long-run, Ethiopia and Egypt would benefit more from cooperation than confrontation. However, given the current turmoil in Egypt and continued repression in Ethiopia, no one really knows how the contentious issue of the Nile would end. One question to ponder is the extent to which the Egyptian military establishment’s position is radically different from that of President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood?”
It is reasonable to entertain the notion that the former Field Marshall decided to opt for diplomacy by giving a little, recognition of the GERD.
Egypt’s Diplomatic Coup
The “good news” is that Egypt has rejoined the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI). Second, Egypt has been forced to acknowledge Ethiopia’s right to build the GERD. In principle, The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement that the Ethiopian Parliament ratified in 2013 replaces the 1929 Colonial Agreement that gave Egypt and Sudan the lion’s share of Nile waters. So, in this sense history is on Ethiopia’s side. In theory, Egypt is in no position to impose all sorts of conditions on Ethiopia if it accepts the Framework; and unless the Ethiopian government falters for its own reasons. A cursory review of negotiations and studies by Egyptian experts since 2011 shows that Egypt was determined not to give an inch with regard to water flows; and, as an insurance policy, decided to have a say in the administration and monitoring of the GERD itself. Article 5 of the Agreement gives Egypt a window of opportunity to have a say in Ethiopia’s project. “The principle of the Dam’s storage reservoir first filling, and dam operation policies,” binds signatories “To apply the recommendations of the international technical experts committee and the results of the final report of the Tripartite National Technical Committee during different stages of the dam project.” It further confirms “The three countries should cooperate to use the final findings in the studies recommended by the Tripartite National Committee and international technical experts to reach:
a) An Agreement on the guidelines for different scenarios of the first filling of the GERD reservoir in parallel with the construction of the dam.
b) An agreement on the guidelines and annual operation policies of the Renaissance Dam, which the owners can adjust from time to time.
c) To inform downstream countries, Egypt and Sudan, on any urgent circumstances that would call for a change in the operations of the Dam, in order to ensure coordination with downstream countries’ water reservoirs.
–Accordingly, the three countries are to establish a proper mechanism through their ministries of water and irrigation.
–The timeframe for such points mentioned above is 15 months from the start of preparing two studies about the dam by the international technical committee.
My reading is that Egypt and Sudan will be in a position to exercise substantial right in the “filling of the reservoir” and the “operational policies” of the Dam. Is this not a surrender of Ethiopia’s sovereignty and national security to Egypt? What is the difference between the Colonial period protocol of giving veto power to Egypt and this Agreement? Is this not ceding Ethiopia’s sovereignty over a national project housed on Ethiopian territory and river over which Ethiopia should be the only power that dictates the construction and operation of its own dam as long as it is done in a responsible manner? Doesn’t Egyptian absolute oversight and interference in Ethiopia’s internal development administration reaffirm Egyptian claim of “historic and natural rights” over the Abbay River? What happens in the event that water flow to Egypt decreases during different stages of the “first filling of the GERD?” Does the Agreement not offer a free hand to Egypt to demand that Ethiopia stops building the dam? I am not an expert on the technicalities of the Dam. Nevertheless, this Agreement compromises Ethiopia’s national sovereignty, national security and long term interests. Its sets the worst precedent possible for the country.
There are additional points. How do we reconcile equitable rights with an Agreement that is patently unfair and unjust? It will be inconceivable for Ethiopia or any other Sub-Saharan African riparian state to exercise oversight in the administration of the Aswan Dam or the construction of future dams by Egypt or Sudan. As far as I can tell from the document Prime Minister Hailemariam signed on behalf of Ethiopia there is no quid pro quo.
Principle 5 diminishes the value contained in 9. “The principle of the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the State” offers a consolation prize. It states “The three countries cooperate on the basis of equal sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the state, mutual benefit and good will, in order to reach the better use and protection of River Nile.” An Agreement that is patently unequal among the three countries cannot, at the same time, engender “equal sovereignty.” In my estimation, it is clear that if this Agreement is ratified by Ethiopia’s single party dominated Parliament, Ethiopia will be at a huge disadvantage for decades to come.
President Sisi made a brilliant move when he addressed the Ethiopian Parliament commending the Ethiopian government for its understanding, flexibility and seeking good will in support of Egypt’s water needs. He acknowledged Ethiopia’s right to build the GERD. From this, let us accept his recognition as “victory” for the Ethiopian government and its supporters” during an election year with a foregone conclusion that the ruling party would win. This “victory” does not diminish the fact that Egypt has attained a diplomatic coup that will affect Ethiopia’s sovereignty, national security and economic interests for decades to come. What Egypt has failed to achieve by military means or through surrogates, the Egyptian President played the diplomatic and public relations game superbly and preserved his country’s security and economic interests. Principle 5 discussed above is illustrative of this coup.
Ethiopia does not do well with regard to other binding principles either. The first principle agreed is that there will be a binding “cooperation in understanding the water needs of upstream and downstream countries across all their lands.” At face value this is fair as long as each country has the right to use its waters for its own development even if it means that there will be some decrease in water flows to Egypt. Is this a trick? For example, will Ethiopia be in a position to build dams for irrigation purposes in accordance with this principle? We do not know. This concern is expressed more fully in Principle 3, “Principle of not causing significant damage.” It says that “The three countries will take all necessary procedures to avoid causing significant damage while using the Blue Nile (Abbay…In case significant damage is caused to one of these countries, the country causing the damage is to take all the necessary procedures to alleviate this damage and discuss compensation whenever convenient.” Just think of this. Both Egypt and Sudan have established enormous irrigated-agriculture employing millions of people and producing food. Egypt not only produces some of its food supplies; it produces the finest cotton on the planet, a gift from Ethiopia. It has built state of the art textile factories that produce garments and other products for the domestic and global market. Ethiopia is no position to dictate to these countries that irrigated farming is water intensive and that, this tradition is no longer sustainable. The greater concern I express is that Ethiopia’s right to use the GERD for some irrigation is not allowed. Further, this precedent might offer Egypt a legal agreement in preventing Ethiopia to build irrigation dams.
What do I conclude?
Two policy issues in the Agreement distress me most. First, the total abandonment of Ethiopia’s sovereignty with regard to the construction, fill of the water reservoir and operation of the GERD whose construction I supported from its inception with substantial critique on ownership and social value added. Second, the fact that Ethiopia is disallowed to use any portion of the waters from the GERD and other future dams for irrigation. The Ethiopian government signed an Agreement that says in effect the following. It is acceptable for Ethiopia to produce hydro power for export but illegal for Ethiopia to use its waters for irrigation. It is acceptable for Ethiopia to build the GERD as long as Egypt exercises overwhelming oversight. I ask myself “How does the Ethiopian government justify binding itself and future governments and generations from managing its own epic hydroelectric power project without interference by Egypt and experts that Egypt approves; and from using waters within Ethiopia’s own boundaries for irrigation that would meet the food requirements of 100 million Ethiopians and growing? This is patently unfair, unjust and unacceptable.
President Sisi signed the Agreement after thorough review of the Principles and substantial consultation with Egyptian experts. His decision was backed by enormous amounts of rigorous research and recommendations. Upon closer reading, I find interesting similarities between elements of the Agreement and Egyptian expert recommendations. I wonder if the same rigor occurred in support of the Ethiopian side. I do not know.
I recall a group called the Group of the Nile Basin (GNB) “composed of Professors from Engineering, Irrigation and Hydraulics” who took matters to the next level. Their ultimate objective was to “support the effort of the Egyptian Government and decision-makers” through scientific research, scenarios and policy options. Their studies showed that Ethiopia’s four large dam projects including the Renaissance Dam posed threats to Egypt’s security. They accused the Ethiopian government of failure “to conduct “sufficient structural and hydrologic studies and environmental assessments.” These experts agreed that the Egyptian government should try to adhere to Agreements of 1929 and 1959 in any negotiation. They concluded, “Reduction in the water share of Egypt will result in abandoning huge areas of agricultural lands and scattering millions of families. It would result in in increasing the pollution of the water streams and creating problems in the supply of water for drinking and industry.” They offered the following recommendations to the Egyptian government thereby undermining Ethiopia’s national interests in advance of the Agreement.
  • “Request stopping the construction of the Dam until completion of negotiations
  • Insist that the maximum size of the Ethiopian Dam must not exceed 14 billion cubic meter compared to the 74 billion cubic meter” designed and under construction by Ethiopia
  • Insist that Ethiopia commit officially not to use the water behind the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) for irrigated agriculture
  • Insist that Ethiopia commit to give advance notice of future projects it has in mind
  • Insist that the design and modification of the GERD be reviewed by Egyptian and international experts
  • Insist that Ethiopia’s Dam must be used solely for electric power generation and never for irrigation
  • Negotiate so that the price of electricity sold to Egypt and Sudan would be at cost thereby nullifying the value added from the project and negating the market itself
  • Insist that filling the waters of the Dam’s reservoir should be staggered over 6 years to reduce disruption to Egypt’s supply and
  • Insist that the operation of the hydro plant should be coordinated with Egypt,” thereby undermining Ethiopia’s sovereignty and diminishing its power.
We therefore knew well in advance that these recommendation offered by Egyptian experts were incongruent with a rising and assertive Sub-Saharan Africa of which Ethiopia is a part. These lop-sided solutions undermine the entire intent of the GERD and Ethiopia’s sovereign right to harness its waters without undue influence and pressure from Egypt or other third parties. Egyptian experts had told the Ethiopian government repeatedly that nothing of substance that will affect the flow of water from the Blue Nile to Egypt would be allowed through negotiation either.
President Sisi went to Ethiopia and lived up to the standard of successive Egyptian governments that their primary responsibility is to defend this sacred water—the source of life—by any means necessary. The Ethiopian people have the right to know specifics of the deal.

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Friday, March 20, 2015

ህጋዊና ፍትሃዊ ያልሆነን ምርጫ እንቃወም!

እውነት ነው “ምርጫ” ዲሞክራሲ በሰፈነበት አገር ከጦር መሳርያ በላይ ይፈራል፣ ይከበራልም። “ፍትሃዊ ምርጫ” ትልቅ ሰላማዊና ህጋዊ የትግል መስክ ነው። እርግጥ ነው ህዝብ መብቱ መከበሩን የሚያረጋግጥበት አይነተኛ ዜዴ“ህጋዊ ምርጫ” ነው። ህዝብ በምርጫ የሰጠው ድምጽ ሲከበርለት መብቱ ሊከበር እንደሚችል ማሳያ ምልክት ነው።
“ምርጫ” በሃገሪቱ የሚካሄደው አንድ ድርጅት ለስልጣን የሚበቃበትንና ስልጣን የሚያራዝምበትን አንድ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ምርጫ ብቻ እንዲካሄድ አድርጎ ስልጣን ለመጨበጥም ሆነ ስልጣን ለማስያዝ አይደለም። በዚያች ሃገር የሚካሄዱ ሁሉም ምርጫዎች ዲሞክራሲያዊ እንዲሆኑ ነው እንጂ። በአገሪቱ በስልጣን ላይ የሚቀመጠው አካል ሁልጊዜም በህዝብ ይሁንታ በሰላማዊና ህጋዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ምርጫ እንዲመነጭ ለማድረግ “ህጋዊ ምርጫ” ዋና መሳሪያ ነው። ይህን ህጋዊ ምርጫ ለማካሄድ ዲሞክራሲያዊ መንግሥት፣ ህጋዊ መንግሥት፣ ለሃገርና ለህዝብ የቆመ መንግሥት፣ነጻና ህጋዊ ምርጫ እንዲካሄድ ፍላጎት ያለው እና በምርጫ መሸነፍና ማሸነፍ እንዳለ የሚገነዘብ መንግሥት ያስፈልጋል። ይህ ካልሆነ ግን ምርጫ ፌዝ፣ ጭዋታና ቀልድ ነው የሚሆነው።
ነጻና ፍትሃዊ ምርጫ አምባገነናዊ፣ ዘረኛ፣ ጨቋኝና አረመኔ ሥርዓት በአለበት አገር ፈጽሞ የሚታሰብ አይደለም። ቢሞከርም ለይስሙላ ካልሆነ በስተቀር ውጤታማ ሊሆን አይቻልም። እንዲህ አይነት መንግሥት በአለበት አገር ምርጫ ማካሄድ በፍቃደኝነት አምባገነን መንግሥትን ለዘመናት ማንገስና በሃገሪቱ ላይ ለረጅም ዓመታት በፈላጭ ቆራጭነትና በማን አለብኝነት እንዲቀመጥ ማድረግ ነው። ለእንዲህ አይነት ለይስሙላ ምርጫ ትልቅ ዋጋ ያለውን እና የመብታችን ማስከበርያ የሆነውን ድምጽ መስጠት አገርንና ህዝብን መበደል ነው፤ እንዲሁም ምንም በማያውቁ የነገ ሃገር ተረካቢ ህፃናት ላይ አምባገነን መንግሥትን በመከራና በጭቆና እንዲያሳድጋቸው መሾም ነው። ህጋዊ ላልሆነ ምርጫ ድምጽን መስጠት እና በማነኛውም መንገድ ተሳታፊ መሆን የታሪክ ተጠያቂ ያደርጋል።
የወያኔን አምባገነናዊነት፣ማንአለብኝነት፣ ጨቋኝነት፣ ብሄርተኝነት፣ ወንበዴነት፣ አገር ሻጭነት፣ ታሪክ አጥፊነት፣ ትውልድ ገዳይነት ላይ ጥያቄ አለን ብየ አላምንም፤ ምክንያቱም የወያኔን ወሮበላነት በሚታይ ገሃዳዊ እውነታና አለም አቀፍ የሰባዊ መብት ተቆርቋሪ ድርጅቶች በትክክለኛ መረጃ የመሰከለሩለት እና የወያኔ ዋነኛ መገለጫ ባህሪው ስለሆነ። ህጋዊና ፍትሃዊ ምርጫ በወያኔ ዘመን የሚታሰብ አይደለም። ለአራት ተከታታይ ምርጫዎች በሚገባ አይተነዋል። የአገራችን ኢትዮጵያ የይስሙላ ምርጫ ከጊዜ ወደ ጊዜ የወያኔን የበላይነት እያረጋገጠ እንጂ የህዝብን መብትና ድምጽን ማስከበር አልቻለም፤ ወደፊትም ወያኔ እስካለ ድረስ የህዝብ ድምጽ ሊከበር አይችልም።
ይህም የሆነበት ዋናው ምክንያት በሃገሪቱ ዲሞክራሲ አለመኖር እና አምባገነናዊ ስርዓት መስፈኑ ነው። በሌላ መልኩ ነጻ የሆነ የፍትህ ስርዓት፣ የሚዲያ አገልግሎት፣ የምርጫ ቦርድ፣ የመከላከያ የደህንነትና የፖሊስ ሃይል ተቋም አለመኖሩ ህጋዊ ምርጫ እንዳይካሄድ እና እንዳይኖር አድርጎታል። እነዚህ ነጻ ተቋማት በሌሉበት ሁኔታ ሃገራዊና ዲሞክራሲያዊ ምርጫ ማካሄድ አይቻልም፤ በእኩልነት ላይ የተመሰረተ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ፓርላማ መገንባት አይቻልም። ጠንካራ የሆነ የመድበለ ፓርቲ ስርዓት በሃገሪቱ እንዲኖር ማድረግ ከባድና አስቸጋሪ ነው። ያሉት የፖለቲካ ድርጅቶችም በወያኔ እጅ የተያዘ የሻማ መብራት ናቸው። ወያኔ ሲፈልግ ያጣፋቸዋል ሲፈልግ ደግሞ ጊዜያዊ ብርሃን እንዲሰጡ ያደርጋቸዋል ነገር ግን ብርሃናቸው ለወያኔ እንጂ እነርሱ እንኳ እንዳይጠቀሙ ጥቁር መጋረጃ ከልሎባቸዋል።
የህዝብን መብትና የህግ የበላይነትን ሊያስከብሩ የሚችሉ ነጻ ተቋማት በኢትዮጵያ እስካልተቋቋሙ ድረስ እና እነዚህን ተቋማት ለመገንባት ወያኔ ፈቃደኛ እስካልሆነ ድረስ ነጻና ፍትሃዊ ምርጫ እናደርጋለን ብሎ መሞኘት አሁንም ለተጨማሪ አምስት አመታት በፍቃደኝነት ወያኔ በአምባገነንነት አገዛዝ ስልጣን ላይ እንዲቆይ እድል መስጠት ነው። በተጨማሪም ወያኔ የህዝብን ድምጽ እንዲሰርቅ ተባባሪ መሆን ነው። ምናልባት ለማታለያ 2 እና 3 ወንበር ለተቃዋሚ ሊሰጥ ይችል ይሆናል ሆኖም ግን ዋናው ዓላማችን የዲሞክራሲ ስርዓት በሃገራችን ለመገንባት እንጂ ስልጣን ላይ ለመንጠልጠል አይደለምና የህዝብን ድምጽ ሊያስከብር የሚችል ፍትሃዊ ምርጫ እስካላካሄድን ድረስ በምርጫ መሳተፍ ከጥቅሙ ጉዳቱ በእጅጉ ያመዝናል።
እንደሚታወቀው በ1997 ዓ.ም ህዝቡ በነቂስ ወጥቶ ድምጹን ይወክሉኛል ላላቸው ወኪሎች በይፋ ሰጦ ነበር፤ ፍጻሜው ግን በአደባባይ ድምጹ ተነጠቀ፤ ብዙዎችም ሰማትነትን እንዲቀበሉ ተደረገ። የቅንጅት አመራር ከወያኔ አፈና ተርፋ ያገኟትን ወንበር ይዘው ፓርላማ ላለመግባት የወስኑት ለእነዚህ መሰረታዊ የዲሞክራሲ ዋስትና ለሆኑ ተቋማት ምስረታ ነበር። ለህዝቡም ጥሪ ያደረጉት የህዝብን ድምጽ ሊያስከብሩ የሚችሉ ነጻ ተቋማት በቅድሚያ ይገንቡ በማለት ጥሪ በማቅረባቸው ምክንያት የኢትዮጵያ ህዝብ በህይወቱ መስዋትነትን ሲከፍል፣ መሪዎቹ ደግሞ ለአሰቃቂ መከራና እስር ተዳረጉ።
ቅንጅት ስለ ነጻ ተቋማት ጥያቄ ከአነሳበት ወቅት ከ1997 ዓ.ም ጀምሮ በሃገራችን ኢትዮጵያ የታየው ሁኔታ እውነትም እነዚህ ነጻ ተቋማት ስማቸው ብቻ እንጂ ምንም አይነት ነጻ ህልውና የሌላቸው ወያኔ ሰራሽ ሳንባ ተገጥሞላቸው በወያኔ መልካም ፍቃድ ብቻ የሚተነፍሱ መሆናቸውን በሚገባ ተረድተናል፤ አውቀናልም። ለአብነት ያክልም የፖለቲካ መሪዎችን፣ ጋዜጠኞችን፣ ጦማርያንን፣ በማነኛውም መልኩ ሥርዓቱን የሚቃዎሙትን፣ የእምነት ተቋማት መሪዎችን እና ንጹኃን ዜጎችን በወያኔ የሃሰት ክስ ተከሰው ፍርድ ቤት ሲቀርቡ ፍርድ ቤት ተብየው የሚበይነውን ቅንጣት ታክል እውነትነት የሌለውን ብይን ማየቱ ነጻ የፍትህ ተቋም ፍጹም አለመኖሩን መረዳት ይቻላል። እንዲሁም የመከላከያ ሰራዊት፣ የደህንነትና የፖሊስ ሃይል አባላት የወያኔ አገልጋይነታቸውን በህዝብ ላይ በተለያየ ጊዜ የሚያደርቱትን ኢሰባዊ ድርጊት መመልከቱ ከበቂ በላይ ማስረጃ ነው፤ የወያኔ እውነተኛ አሽከርና አሻንጉሊት መሆኑንም በሚገባ አረጋግጧል። ሰራዊቱ ከፖለቲካ ጌቶቹ በሚሰጠው ትዕዛዝ ሴት፣ወንድ፣ ወጣት፣ ጎልማሳ፣ አረጋዊ ፣የተማረና ያልተማረ ሳይል በግፍ ወደ እስር ቤት ወርውሯል፣ ዛሬም ካለምንም ርህራሄ በማጎር ላይ ይገኛል። የተቃዋሚ ድርጅቶች መሪዎችን በማሰርና ለአምባገነን ስርዓቱ እንዲመች ተደርጎ በረቀቀው ጸረ-ሽብር ህግ በመታገዝ በሽብርተኝነት በመፈረጅ የእድሜ ልክ እስራት ሲያስፈርድባቸው እናያለን። የኢትዮጵያ ህዝብ እንደ እራሱ ወያኔ ሞኝ መስሎት አሸባሪ እያለ ለማጥላላት ሲሞክር እያየን ነው።
መገናኛ ብዙኃንም የጠነዛ እጅ እጅ የሚለውን የወያኔ ፕሮፓጋንዳ ብቻ እንደ ገደል ማሚቶ ሲያስተጋባ ይውላል። የመገናኛ ብዙኃን ተቋሙ ከእስር የተረፉ እውነተኛ ጋዜጠኞችን ለስደት በመዳረግ የወያኔ ተላላኪዎችና የአድር ባይ ጥቅመኞች ስብስብ ሁኗል። የምርጫ ቦርድ ተቋሙም ከምስረታው ጀምሮ ነጻ ተቋም ሳይሆን የወያኔ ምርጫ አስፈጻሚ አካል እንደሆነ ጥርጥር የለውም። ለወያኔ ስጋት የሆኑ ተቃዋሚ ድርጅቶች እጭዎችን እንዳይመዘገቡ በማድረግ ከምርጫ ይሰርዛል፤ ይደልዛል። ሌላው ቀርቶ የውጭ ታዛቢዎች እንኳ እንደ 97ቱ ገብተው እንዳይታዘቡ መንገዶችን ዘግቷል። እነሱም ነጻ እና ፍትሃዊ ምርጫ እንደማይኖር እርግጠኛ በመሆን ጊዜያቸውንና ገንዘባቸውን ከማባከን ተቆጥበዋል። “ ነጻ ተቋማት ተመስርተው ነጻና ፍትሃዊ ምርጫ ቢደረግ በመላ ሃገሪቱ ልክ በ1997ቱ ምርጫ በአዲስ አበባ እንደታየው አንድም ሰው አይመርጠኝም” የሚል ጽኑ ፍራቻ ወያኔ ስላደረበት እውነትም ስለሆነ ነጻ ተቋማትን ወያኔ በጥብቅ ቁጥጥር ስር አውሏቸዋል።
ታዲያ ይህ ከሆነ በወያኔ ዘምን “ፍታዊና ህጋዊ ምርጫ” እንዴት እውን ይሆናል ብሎ ጊዜን፣ ጉልበትንና ገንዘብን በከንቱ ለይስሙላ ምርጫ ማጥፋት ይቻላል የሚለው መሰረታዊ ጥያቄ አፋጣኝ መልስ ይሻል። እንደ እኔ ህጋዊና ፍትሃዊ ባልሆነ ምርጫ ተሳትፎ ድምጽን በፍቃደኝነት ከመሸጥ ይልቅ ለውጥ ሊያመጣ በሚችል መልኩ ተግባራዊ እርምጃ ለመውሰድ እራስን ማዘጋጀትና ቢያንስ የሚከተሉትን ተግባራት ህብረትን ፈጥሮ በአንድነት መተግበር በእጅጉ ያስፈልጋል፤ ዘላቂ ለውጥ ማምጣት ይቻላል።

1. ድምጽን ሊያስከበሩ የሚችሉ ነጻ ተቋማትን ለመገንባት ተግባራዊ እርምጃ መውሰድ (የነጻ ተቋማትን ምንነትና ተግባር ለህብረተሰቡ በቂ ግንዛቤ ከመፍጠር ይጀምራል)
2. ከምርጫ በፊት የህግ የበላይነት እንዲከበር ሃገራዊ ጥሪ ማድረግ (የህግ የበላይነት ሳይኖር የህዝብ ድምጽ ሊከበር አይችልምና)
3. የህሌና እስረኞች እንዲፈቱ “ምርጫን” ትልቅ መከራከርያ ነጥብ አድርጎ በጽኑ መታገል
4. ተቃዋሚዎች በትብብር መስራትና ለአባሎቻቸው ሙሉ ዋስትና ሊኖራቸው እንዲችል ስልታዊ እቅድ ነድፎ ትልቅ ሥራ መስራት(ተመራጭ እጭዎች እንኳ ዋስትና ሳይኖራቸው ምን አይነት ምርጫ ለማካሄድ ነው ጊዜ የምናጠፋው)
5. ለፍትህ ስርዓት፣ ለብዙኃን መገናኛ/ሚዲያ አገልግሎት፣ ለምርጫ አስፈጻሚ ቦርድ፣ ለመከላከያ የደህንነትና የፖሊስ ሃይል አባላት በሙሉ ከወያኔ ጉዳይ አስፈጻሚነት ተቆጥበው ለህዝብና ከህዝብ ጋር እንዲቆሙ ግልጽ ደብዳቤ መጻፍ(መልእክቱ በቅርብ ቤተሰቦቻቸው አማካኝነት እንዲደርሳቸው ማድረግ)
6. ጸረ-ሽብር ህጉን የወያኔ መንግሥት እንዲፈትሽና ለንጹኃን ዜጎች የእስር ማጎርያ ዜዴ ማድረጉን እንዲያቆም በአጽንኦት ማሳሰብ
7. እያንዳንዱን የህዝብ ጥያቄ ለሰባዊ መብት ተቆርቋሪ ድርጅቶችና ለተባበሩት መንግሥታት ማሳወቅ

ወያኔ ከላይ በጥቂቱ የተገለጹትን ጥያቄዎች ተቀብሎ ተግባራዊ ማድረግ ካልቻለ በህብረትና በአንድነት ነጻነት፣ ፍትህና ዲሞክራሲ በኢትዮጵያ እንዲሰፍን በቀጥታ ወደ ቀጣይ ህዝባዊ እምቢተኝነት መሸጋገር፡
  • በመጀመርያ ብሄራዊ አንድነትን መስበክና የህዝብን አንድነት ማጠናከር
  •  ህዝባዊ አመጾችን በሁሉም አቅጣጫ ማነሳሳት
  • ማንኛውንም አገልግሎት በሚሰጡ የመንግሥት ተቋማት ላይ ማዕቀብ መጣል
  • የተማሪዎች የተቃውሞ እንቅስቃሴዎች (ከከፍተኛ ትምህርት ተቋማት እስከ መለስተኛ ሁለተኛ ደረጃ ት/ቤት) ለውጥ ሊያመጣ በሚችል መልኩ ግንባር ቀደም እንዲሆኑ አቅጣጫ ማሳየት
  • ወጣቱን የህብረተሰብ ክፍል የሃገሪቱ ወሳኝ አካል መሆኑን ተረድቶ ለመብቱ እንዲቆም ማድረግ
  • የሥራ ማቆም አድማ በሁሉም የሃገሪቱ ክፍል ማድረግ
  • በአደባባይ የምርጫን ካርድ ማቃጠል
  • የውጭ እምቢተኝነትን አጠናክሮ መቀጠል 
በአጠቃላይ በሃገራችን ነፃና ፍትሃዊ ምርጫ እንዲደረግ ዴሞክራሲ፣ ፍትህ፣ ነጻነት፣ ሰላምና እኩልነት እንዲሰፍን ከተፈለገ ከይስሙላ ምርጫ እራሳችንን አቅበን አምባገነን የወያኔ ወሮ በላ አገዛዝን ከኢትዮጵያ ህዝብ ትክሻ ላይ ለማሶገድ በጋራ ጠንካራ ህብረት በመፍጠር ሁሉንም የተለያዩ የትግል ስልቶችን በተለያየ ቦታና ጊዜ መጠቀም። ውጤቱ ቀድሞ በታወቀ ምርጫ ከመሳተፍ ተቆጥበን ጸረ-ዲሞክራሲ፣ ጸረ-ህዝብና ጸረ-ኢትዮጵያ የሆነውን የወያኔ ህገ ወጥና አምባገነናዊ አገዛዝን ከስሩ ነቅሎ በመጣል እውነተኛ የኢትዮጵያን ትንሣኤ እንጎናጸፍ።

ህገ ወጥ ምርጫን በመቃወም የህዝብን ድምጽ እናስከብር!
ከይስሙላ ምርጫ ይልቅ ነጻ ተቋማት ግንባታ ላይ ጊዜያችንን እናጥፋ!

ድል ለኢትዮጵያ ህዝብ!ኢትዮጵያ ለዘላለም ትኑር!

Sunday, March 15, 2015

FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2015: Ethiopia

OVERVIEW:
In 2014 the Ethiopian government continued to suppress free speech and associational rights, shattering hopes for meaningful reform under Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn. Government harassment and arrest of prominent opposition and media members continued, including the April arrest of nine journalists who were charged under Ethiopia’s controversial antiterrorism law. In April and May, massive protests in Oromia Regional State broke out following the announcement of the planned expansion of Addis Ababa into Oromia. At least 17 people died after the military fired on unarmed protesters.
Despite nascent signs of an opening with Eritrea, formal dialogues remain frozen between the two countries. The Ethiopian-Eritrean border remains highly militarized, though no major border clashes were reported in 2014.
Sporadic violence resumed in Ethiopia’s Ogaden region after talks failed in 2013 between the government and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), a separatist group that has fought for independence since 1991. In January 2014, two ONLF negotiators dispatched to Nairobi for a third round of talks were abducted and allegedly turned over to Ethiopian authorities by Kenyan police. The kidnappings effectively ended the talks.
Ethiopia ranked 32 out of 52 countries surveyed in the Ibrahim Index of African Governance, below the continental average and among the bottom in East Africa. The country’s modest gains in the index are due to its improvement in human development indicators, but its ranking is held back by low scores in the “Participation and Human Rights” category.

POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES:

Political Rights: 7 / 40 [Key]

A. Electoral Process: 1 / 12


Ethiopia’s bicameral parliament is made up of a 108-seat upper house, the House of Federation, and a 547-seat lower house, the House of People’s Representatives. The lower house is filled through popular elections, while the upper chamber is selected by the state legislatures; members of both houses serve five-year terms. The lower house selects the prime minister, who holds most executive power, and the president, a largely ceremonial figure who serves up to two six-year terms. Hailemariam has served as prime minister since September 2012, and Mulatu Teshome as president since October 2013.
The 2010 parliamentary and regional elections were tightly controlled by the ruling coalition party Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), with reports of voters being threatened with losing their jobs, homes, or government services if they failed to turn out for the EPRDF. Opposition party meetings were broken up, and candidates were threatened and detained. Opposition-aligned parties saw their 160-seat presence in parliament virtually disappear, with the EPRDF and its allies taking all but 2 of the 547 seats in the lower house. The next elections are scheduled for 2015.

B. Political Pluralism and Participation: 2 / 16

Shorn of their representation in parliament and under pressure by the authorities, opponents of the EPRDF find it difficult to operate. In July 2014, opposition members—two from Unity for Democracy Party, one from the Arena Tigray Party, and one from the Blue Party—were arrested without charges and held without access to legal representation. The Ethiopian government denies the arrests were related to 2015 elections, but the detainments follow the government’s pattern of suppressing political dissent prior to popular votes.
A series of December 2014 rallies by a coalition of opposition parties saw nearly 100 people arrested, including the chairman of the Semayawi Party. Witnesses report that police beat protesters, though nearly all those arrested were released on bail within a week.
Political parties in Ethiopia are often ethnically based. The EPRDF coalition is comprised of four political parties and represents several ethnic groups. The government tends to favor Tigrayan ethnic interests in economic and political matters, and the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front dominates the EPRDF. While the 1995 constitution grants the right of secession to ethnically based states, the government acquired powers in 2003 to intervene in states’ affairs on issues of public security. Secessionist movements in Oromia and the Ogaden have largely failed after being put down by the military.

C. Functioning of Government: 4 / 12

Ethiopia’s governance institutions are dominated by the EPRDF, which controlled the succession process following the death of longtime Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in 2012.
Corruption remains a significant problem in Ethiopia. EPRDF officials reportedly receive preferential access to credit, land leases, and jobs. Petty corruption extends to lower-level officials, who solicit bribes in return for processing documents. In 2013, the government attempted to demonstrate its commitment to fighting corruption after the release of a World Bank study that detailed corruption in the country. As part of the effort, the Federal Ethics & Anti-Corruption Commission made a string of high-profile arrests of prominent government officials and businessmen throughout 2013 and 2014. The Federal High Court sentenced many corrupt officials in 2014, including in one case a $2,500 fine and 16 years in prison. Despite cursory legislative improvements, however, enforcement of corruption-related laws remains lax in practice and Ethiopia is still considered “highly corrupt,” ranked 110 out of 175 countries and territories by Transparency International’s 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index.

Civil Liberties: 11 / 40

D. Freedom of Expression and Belief: 3 / 16


Ethiopia’s media are dominated by state-owned broadcasters and government-oriented newspapers. Privately owned papers tend to steer clear of political issues and have low circulation. A 2008 media law criminalizes defamation and allows prosecutors to seize material before publication in the name of national security.
According to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), Ethiopia holds at least 17 journalists behind bars—the second-highest number of jailed journalists in Africa as of December 2014, after Eritrea. Restrictions are particularly tight on journalists perceived to be sympathetic to protests by the Muslim community, and journalists attempting to cover them are routinely detained or arrested. Those reporting on opposition activities also face harassment and the threat of prosecution under Ethiopia’s sweeping 2009 Antiterrorism Proclamation. At least 14 journalists have been convicted under Ethiopia’s antiterror law since 2011, and none convicted have been released.
In April 2014, police arrested nine journalists—six associated with the Zone9 blogging collective and three freelancers—and charged them with terror-related offenses. Their trial has been postponed 13 times and was closed to the public until recently; their defense lawyer claims the defendants were forced to sign false confessions while in prison.
In June, the government fired 18 people from a state-run, Oromia-based broadcaster, silencing the outlet’s reporting on Oromo protests. In August, the government charged six Addis Ababa–based publications with terrorism offenses, effectively shuttering some of the last independent news outlets inside Ethiopia. In October, three publication owners were convicted in absentia after they fled the country. The same month, Temesgen Desalegn, former editor of the weekly Feteh, was convicted under Ethiopia’s criminal code on defamation and incitement charges and sentenced to three years in prison.
Due to the risks of operating inside the country, many Ethiopian journalists work in exile. CPJ says Ethiopia drove 30 journalists into exile in 2014, a sharp increase over both 2012 and 2013. Authorities use high-tech jamming equipment to filter and block news websites seen as pro-opposition. According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), since 2010 the Ethiopian government has developed a robust and sophisticated internet and mobile framework to monitor journalists and opposition groups, block access to unwanted websites or critical television and radio programs, and collect evidence for prosecutions in politically motivated trials.
The constitution guarantees religious freedom, but the government has increasingly harassed the Muslim community, which has grown to rival the Ethiopian Orthodox Church as the country’s largest religious group. Muslim groups accuse the government of trying to impose the beliefs of an obscure Islamic sect, Al-Ahbash, at the expense of the dominant Sufi-influenced strain of Islam. A series of protests against perceived government interference in religious affairs since 2012 have ended in a number of deaths and more than 1,000 arrests.
Academic freedom is often restricted in Ethiopia. The government has accused universities of being pro-opposition and prohibits political activities on campuses. There are reports of students being pressured into joining the EPRDF in order to secure employment or places at universities; professors are similarly pressured in order to ensure favorable positions or promotions. The Ministry of Education closely monitors and regulates official curricula, and the research, speech, and assembly of both professors and students are frequently restricted. In 2014, the Scholars at Risk network catalogued three incidents in academia, including the jailing or firing of professors who expressed antigovernment opinions.
The presence of the EPRDF at all levels of society—directly and, increasingly, electronically—inhibits free private discussion. Many people are wary of speaking against the government. The EPRDF maintains a network of paid informants, and opposition politicians have accused the government of tapping their phones.

E. Associational and Organizational Rights: 0 / 12

Freedoms of assembly and association are guaranteed by the constitution but limited in practice. Organizers of large public meetings must request permission from the authorities 48 hours in advance. Applications by opposition groups are routinely denied and, in cases when approved, organizers are subject to government meddling to move dates or locations. Since 2011, ongoing peaceful demonstrations held by members of the Muslim community have been met with violent responses from security forces. Protesters allege government interference in religious affairs and politically motivated selection of members of the Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme Council. Though momentum has slowed, protests continue.
After the government announced an expansion of Addis Ababa’s city limits into the Oromia Regional State in April 2014, thousands of Ethiopians took to the streets. Witnesses reported that police fired on peaceful protesters, killing at least 17—most of whom were students in nearby universities—and detained hundreds.
The 2009 Charities and Societies Proclamation restricts the activities of foreign nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) by prohibiting work on political and human rights issues. Foreign NGOs are defined as groups receiving more than 10 percent of their funding from abroad, a classification that includes most domestic organizations as well. The law also limits the amount of money any NGO can spend on “administration,” a controversial category that the government has declared includes activities such as teacher or health worker training, further restricting NGO operations even on strictly development projects. NGOs have struggled to maintain operations as a result of the law.
Trade union rights are tightly restricted. Neither civil servants nor teachers have collective bargaining rights. All unions must be registered, and the government retains the authority to cancel registration. Two-thirds of union members belong to organizations affiliated with the Confederation of Ethiopian Trade Unions, which is under government influence. Independent unions face harassment, and trade union leaders are regularly imprisoned. There has not been a legal strike since 1993.

F. Rule of Law: 3 / 16

The judiciary is officially independent, but its judgments rarely deviate from government policy. The 2009 antiterrorism law gives great discretion to security forces, allowing the detention of suspects for up to four months without charge. After August 2013 demonstrations to protest the government’s crackdown on Muslims, 29 demonstration leaders were charged under the antiterrorism law with conspiracy and attempting to establish an Islamic state; their trial remains ongoing. Trial proceedings have been closed to the public, media, and the individuals’ families. According to HRW, some defendants claimed that their access to legal counsel has been restricted.
Conditions in Ethiopia’s prisons are harsh, and detainees frequently report abuse. A 2013 HRW report documented human rights violations in Addis Ababa’s Maekelawi police station, including verbal and physical abuse, denial of basic needs, and torture.
Yemen’s June 2014 arrest and extradition of British citizen Andargachew Tsige to Ethiopia at the government’s request has sparked outrage from human rights groups. Andargachew is the secretary-general of banned opposition group Ginbot 7 and was sentenced to death in absentia in 2009 and again in 2012 for allegedly plotting to kill government officials. Reports suggest that police have denied the British Embassy consular access.
Domestic NGOs say that Ethiopia held as many as 400 political prisoners in 2012, though estimates vary significantly. Nuredine “Aslan” Hasan, a student belonging to the Oromo ethnic group, died in prison in 2014; conflicting reports about the cause of his death—including torture—have not been verified.
The federal government generally has strong control and direction over the military, though forces such as the Liyu Police in the Ogaden territory sometimes operate independently.
Repression of the Oromo and ethnic Somalis, and government attempts to coopt their parties into subsidiaries of the EPRDF, have fueled nationalism in both the Oromia and Ogaden regions. Persistent claims that government troops in the Ogaden area have committed war crimes are difficult to verify, as independent media are barred from the region. The government’s announcement of its intention to expand Addis Ababa’s city limits into the Oromia Regional State exacerbates tensions over historical marginalization of Oromia; according to activists, the expansion will displace two million Oromo farmers.
Same-sex sexual activity is prohibited by law and punishable by up to 15 years’ imprisonment.

G. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights: 5 / 16

While Ethiopia’s constitution establishes freedom of movement, insecurity—particularly in eastern Ethiopia—prevents unrestricted movement into affected sites.
Private business opportunities are limited by rigid state control of economic life and the prevalence of state-owned enterprises. All land must be leased from the state. The government has evicted indigenous groups from various areas to make way for projects such as hydroelectric dams. It has also leased large tracts of land to foreign governments and investors for agricultural development in opaque deals that have displaced thousands of Ethiopians. Up to 70,000 people have been forced to move from the western Gambella region, although the government denies the resettlement plans are connected to land investments. Similar evictions have taken place in Lower Omo Valley, where government-run sugar plantations have put thousands of pastoralists at risk by diverting their water supplies. Journalists and international organizations have persistently alleged that the government withholds development assistance from villages perceived as being unfriendly to the ruling party.
Women are relatively well represented in parliament, holding 28 percent of seats and three ministerial posts. Legislation protects women’s rights, but these rights are routinely violated in practice. Enforcement of the law against rape and domestic abuse is patchy, and cases routinely stall in the courts. Female genital mutilation and forced child marriage are technically illegal, though there has been little effort to prosecute perpetrators. In December 2012, the government made progress against forced child labor, passing a National Action Plan to Eliminate the Worst Forms of Child Labor and updating its list of problematic occupations for children.

Scoring Key: X / Y (Z)

X = Score Received

Y = Best Possible Score

Z = Change from Previous Year

Friday, March 13, 2015

አርበኞች ግንቦት7 – በህወሓት ላይ የሚቀርቡ ተቃውሞዎች ሁሉ ወደ እምቢተኝነት ይደጉ!


የኢትዮጵያ ሕዝብ በአለፉት 23 ዓመታት በህወሓት ዘረኛ አገዛዝ የደረሰበት ስቃይ እንዲቀንስ፤ ገዢዎቹ ከጫንቃው እንዲወዱ፤ ህወሓትን አውርዶ የሚፈልጋቸው መሪዎችን በነፃነት እንዲመርጥ ሲጠይቅና አቤቱታ ሲያሰማ ቆይቷል። በ1997 ዓ.ም. የኢትዮጵያ ሕዝብ ምኞት የሚሳካ መስሎ የታየ የነበረ ቢሆንም በአገዛዙ አረመኔዓዊ እርምጃ ተሰናክሏል። ከጥቂት ዓመታት ወዲህ “ድምፃችን ይሰማ” የሚሉ አቤታዎች ከተለያዩ የኅብረተሰብ ክፍሎች መምጣት ጀምሯል – “ድምፃችን ይሰማ ሙስሊሞች”፣ “ድምፃችን ይሰማ ኦርቶዶክሶች”፣ “ድምፃችን ይሰማ መምህራን”፣ “ድምፃችን ይሰማ ተማሪዎች”፣ … ወዘተ። በተለይ ሙስሊም ወገኖቻችን በተደራጀ መንገድ “ድምፃችን ይሰማ” እያሉ ሲወተውቱ ሦስት ተከታታይ ዓመታት አልፈዋል። ወገኖቻችን “ድምፃችን ይሰማ” በማለታቸው ተደብድበዋል፣ ታስረዋል፣ ተገድለዋል።

አቤቱታ የሚሰማ ጆሮ የሌለው አገዛዝ ሲገጥም ምን ይደረጋል? ለአቤቱታ አቅራቢው ያለው ምርጫ ከሁለት አንድ ነው። ወይ አቤቱታን እርግፍ አድርጎ ጥሎ በደልን ተቀብሎ “እህህ !” እያሉ መኖር፤ አሊያም “በቃኝ፣ እንቢ አልገዛም” ማለት፤ ሦስተኛ ምርጫ የለም።
አቤቱታ ሰሚ ሲያጣ እና ሕዝብ መሮት “እንቢኝ፣ አልገዛም” ሲል ነው ሕዝባዊ እምቢተኝነት ተቀሰቀሰ የሚባለው። ሕዝባዊ እምቢተኝነት ብዙ መልኮችና ቅርጾች ቢኖሩትም ዋነኛዎቹ መገለጫዎች ሁለት ናቸው። አገዛዙ ሕዝብ እንዲያደርግ የሚፈልገውን አለማድረግ እና/ወይም አገዛዙ ሕዝብ እንዲያደርግ የማይፈልገውን ማድረግ።
ለምሳሌ፣ አገዛዙ ሹማምንቱ እንዲከበሩ፣ ሕዝብ እንዲታዘዝላቸው ይፈልጋል፤ እንቢ ያለ ሕዝብ ግን የአገዛዙን ሹማምንት ይንቃል፣ በየደረሱት ያዋርዳቸዋል፣ “አልታዘዛችሁም” ይላቸዋል። ማንኛውም መንግስት የዳኝነት ሥርዓቱ እንዲከበርለት ይፈልጋል፤ በደል የመረረው ሕዝብ ግን የአምባገነኖች ችሎት ውሳኔ አይቀበልም፤ ዳኞችንም ዳኝነትንም አያከብርም። ሕዝብ የመንግሥትን ግብር በወቅቱ እንዲከፍል የማንኛውም መንግሥት ፍላጎት ነው። በመንግሥት ያመረረ ሕዝብ ግን ግብር አይከፍልም፤ መክፈል ግድ ከሆነበትም አዘግይቶ፣ አስለፍቶ ነው። የመረረው ሕዝብ ምሬቱን መፃፍ በሌለበት ቦታ ይጽፋል። በደል የበዛበት ሕዝብ “ዝም በል” ሲሉት ይናገራል፤ “ተናገር” ሲሉት ዝም ይላል።
አገራችን ኢትዮጵያ ውስጥ የሕዝባዊ እምቢተኝተኝነት እርምጃዎች ጅምሮች እየታዩ ነው። በአማራ ክልል፣ ሕዝብ በሹማምንት ላይ የራሱን እርምጃ መውሰድ ጀምሯል። ሕዝብ ራሱ የፓሊስንም የፍርድ ቤትንም ሥራ ተክቶ እየሠራ ነው። ይህ መበረታታት ያለበት ትልቅ እርምጃ ነው። እንደዚሁም ሁሉ በተለይ ወጣቶች ብሶቶቻቸውን በብር ኖቶች ላይ ጽፈው ገበያው እንዲያዘዋውራቸው እያደረጉ ነው። ይህም “የወረቀት ገንዘብን ለተሠራበት ዓላማ ብቻ ተጠቀሙ” የሚለውን ህግ በመጣስ ለቅስቀሳ ሥራ መጠቀም በመሆኑ የሕዝባዊ እምቢተኝነት አካል ነው። በሚቀጥሉት ጥቂት ወራት ውስጥ በርካታ የወረቀት ገንዘቦች በምሬት መግለጫነት ይውላሉ ተብሎ ይገመታል።
በተጓዳኝ በርካታ አማራጭ ስልቶች ሥራ ላይ መዋል ይኖርባቸዋል። ለምሳሌ፣ ተቀማጭ ገንዘብን ከህወሓት ባንኮች ማውጣት በቀላሉ ተግባራዊ ሊደረግ የሚችል ስልት ነው። በውጋጋን ባንክ ተጀምሮ ወደ አንበሳ ኢንተርናሽናል ከዚያም ወደ ንግድ ባንክ ማሸጋገር ይቻላል።
በወገኖቻችን ላይ የግፍ ፍርድ የሚያስፈርዱ አቃቢያነ ህግ እና የግፍ ብይኖችን የሚሰጡ ዳኞች በቸልታ ሊታለፉ አይገባም። በእስር ቤቶችም በወገኖቻችን ላይ ሰቆቃ እየፈፀሙ ያሉ ጨካኞች ከሰላማዊ ሕዝብ ጋር ተደባልቀው ሰላማዊ ሕይወት እንዲመሩ ሊፈቀድላቸው አይገባም። እነዚህ ሁሉ ሊወገዙ፣ ሊገለሉ፣ በየደረሱበት ሊዋረዱ ይገባል።
በአገዛዙ መንግሥታዊ መዋቅር ውስጥ የሚገኙ ወገኖቻችን በሥራቸው ላይ መለገም ተቀባይነት ያለው በጎ ተግባር እንደሆነ ሰፊ ግንዛቤ ሊያገኝ ይገባል። ከአምባገነን ሥርዓት ጋር መተባበር እኩይ ተግባር ሲሆን አምባገነን ሥርዓትን ከውስጥ መቦርቦር ደግሞ የሚበረታታ ሰናይ ሥራ ነው።
ለወያኔ አገዛዝ ግብር መክፈል የምናቆምበት ሰዓትም ተቃርቧል። በራሳችን ገንዘብ ገዳዮቻችን እንዲሰለጥኑብን መፍቀድ የለብንም። ስለሆነም “ግብር አንከፍልም”፤ “መዋጮዎቻችሁ አይመለከቱንም” የምንልበት ቀን ቀርቧል።
በፋይዳ የለሽ ምርጫ የሀገር ሀብት ሲመዘበር ማየት አንሻም። በአግባቡ ለማይቆጠር ድምፃችን አንድም ደቂቃ የምናባክንበት ምክንያት የለምና ሁላችንም የምርጫ ካርዶቻችንን ቀዳደን ቁርጭራጮቹን በየመንገዱ ልንበትናቸው ይገባል።
እነዚህን እነዚህን የመሳሰሉ ናቸው የሕዝባዊ እምቢተኝነት የመጀመሪያ ደረጃዎች። እነዚህን እያደረግን በምስጢር መደራጀታችንን እንቀጥል። ከጥቂት በኋላ አምባገነኑን ሥርዓት የሚያንበረክክ ኃይል እንፈጥራለን። ጥቃት ቢደርስ የሚመክት ኃይል የተደራጀ በመሆኑም ሕዝባዊ እምቢተኝነትና ሕዝባዊ አመጽ ተቀናጅተው እንዲሄዱ ይደረጋል።
አርበኞች ግንቦት 7:የአንድነትና ዲሞክራሲ ንቅናቄ ሕዝባዊ እምቢተኝነትንና ሕዝባዊ አመጽን አቀናጅቶ ለመምራት የተዘጋጀ፤ ለዚህ የሚያበቃው ድርጅታዊ አቅም እየገነባ ያለ ድርጅት ነው። አርበኞች ግንቦት 7 “እንሰባሰብ በወያኔ ላይ የምናቀርባቸው ተቃውሞዎች በሙሉ ወደ እምቢተኝነት ከፍ እናድርጋቸው” ይላል።

ድል ለኢትዮጵያ ሕዝብ!!!
አርበኞች ግንቦት7:የአንድነትና የዲሞክራሲ ንቅናቄ